growth and proliferation of such institutions and their increasing agency have brought them into greater and much-needed scrutiny as a form of transnational governance, with respect to their normative underpinnings, legitimacy and allocative effects. 6 In view of all this, what can theories of justice bring to international economic law and its institutions? First, theories of justice can help us determine the proper objective of international economic law and policy. To a large extent, of course, both domestic and international politics and national self-interest influence the objectives of specific treaties and institutions. But the social analysis of the ends and means of international economic law cannot end with an empirical study of the power and interests which shape it -we must also determine as best we can the proper aims for international economic law according to our understanding of what is helpful, fair and just (and therefore legitimate) 7 , as with any other area of law, policy and the public exercise of political power. And even diplomats, trade negotiators and bureaucrats are influenced by concerns over justice, fairness and progressive social outcomes, within the limits of their institutional mandate and the politics they work with.
Second, theories of justice can help us evaluate whether or not international economic law as a whole, and specific treaties, rules and institutions, are "fair" or "unfair" according to our various competing understandings of such principles. Amartya Sen has recently written persuasively about the two major differing approaches to such an inquiry: the "transcendental institutionalism" approach in which we seek a single comprehensive view of fairness; and the 'realization-focused comparison' approach in which multiple competing views of fairness (and unfairness) help us reach a decision to act against grave injustice according to a variety of reasons. 9 More will be said about this below, but the essential point is that we need a rich multitude of critical views on fairness and unfairness in global economic relations if we are to persuasively and effectively address social injustice. And, as with any system of social allocation, we can't afford to ignore questions of fairness and social injustice in international economic law, if for no other reason than that the risk of perceived unfairness and its social consequences is too serious.
10
Third, theories of justice can help us evaluate whether international economic law institutions are legitimate. Legitimacy is implicated in and, in a sense, already underlies any discussion of justice, although the two concepts are distinct. Rawls calls justice the "first virtue of social institutions" 11 because one of the problems in a democratic society is the imposition of the will of the majority, upon a minority. 12 Thus the only way to minimize that friction is to construct institutions that are just. As international institutions expand, they compete with national institutions for legitimacy, and thus justice becomes an important metric in how legitimate these international institutions are. Although an institution could conceivably be legitimate even when its aim is not the pursuit of global justice, this claim is less and less true at a time in which global public reason demands that international institutions pursue global justice at least to a certain degree.
13
There are several ways through which the legitimacy of international institutions can be assessed. The most common way is to look to formal measures of legitimacy such as treaty ratification, or to institutional consistency with broad political values such as democratic participation. Another way to look at the problem of legitimacy that explicitly connects it to the 11 RAWLS, THEORY OF JUSTICE 3. 12 Id., at 319. 13 Even a critic such as Thomas Nagel writes of the minimal yet discernible (and meaningful) trajectory of justice in existing international institutions. Thomas Nagel, The Problem of Global Justice, 33 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 113, 146-7 (2005) . See also Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Human Rights and International Economic Law, (in this volume) (manuscript at 12, on file with authors) (discussing constitutional and justice aspects of public reason with respect to international economic law). Joshua Cohen and Michael Sabel argue that global public reason play an important role in evaluating the legitimacy of international institutions and has seriously impacted the policies and behavior of international institutions. In contemporary global societal and informational infrastructure, international institutions can feel as close to private individuals as domestic institutions creating similar expectations of justice and legitimacy from such institutions in the same way as they do towards domestic institutions. Cohen and Sabel write:
"A transnational politics of movements and organizations-beyond the intergovernmental politics between states-now routinely contests and aims to reshape the activities of supranational rulemaking bodies. Those efforts work in part through protest, in part by representing interests to those bodies, and in part by advancing norms, values, and standards of reasonableness-that is, by suggesting potential elements of a global public reason that might serve as a common ground of argument in assessing the practices and performances in global politics."
Joshua Cohen and Michael Sabel, Global Democracy? 37 NYU J. L. & Pol., 763-797 (2005) conversation on justice, is by looking at the goals of these institutions (whether in their charter or ones they have come to assume gradually -both kinds can be found in the WTO) and assess to what degree these institutions are delivering outcomes consistent with these objectives. In this chapter we look at legitimacy from the point of view of what Aaron James has called "internal" approaches to justice, in which one looks either at the mandate and formal structure of an organization as well as its members' expectations, or at core constitutive elements of the underlying social interaction (here the role of consent in trade as a human experience), and then evaluates the performance of the organization against those "internal" elements.
Theories of justice can also suggest alternative models and specific reforms to make international economic law more fair (and therefore more legitimate), if we decide that it is not particularly fair in whole or in part -our fourth point. 14 It is part of the mandate of international institutions such as the WTO, the World Bank and the IMF that they pursue goals of global justice. Such institutions are controversial in part because of the idea (properly conceived or misconceived) that they are not doing enough in this respect, or that taken as a whole they are responsible for the stark imbalances in global wealth distribution. 15 What theories of justice can offer in this discussion is a fundamental understanding of the role of justice in international economic institutions, which coupled with a close understanding of the operational structure of these institutions can help us formulate both new policy options and benchmarks or metrics for evaluating progress towards a more just arrangement.
16
Finally, and in an overall sense independent of the substantive merit of particular views or institutions, theories of justice offer international economic law actors, students and critics a 14 An excellent recent example is GILLIAN BROCK, GLOBAL JUSTICE, supra note 2. 15 See, e.g., JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 18-22 (2003); Douglas Arner, Lending And...: Conditionality (in this volume) . 16 See "Conclusion," GLOBAL JUSTICE AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW supra note 5.
powerful normative language through which to articulate their goals for international economic law and policy, and their critiques of the system's existing mission, structure, operation and effects. Much as when in interpersonal communication we reach for the language of poetry and ritual to express the significance of a moment, in law we reach for the language of justice to express our deepest aspirations and disappointments with respect to the law itself.
This chapter aims to review the issues and opportunities that arise in the application of theories of justice to international economic law and its institutions, particularly within the context of the global justice debate. We will survey the basic avenues of approach to the subject, the technical and policy issues which arise in the undertaking, specific key topics of interest in this area such as the trade linkage phenomenon and its relationship to justice, and the major obstacles which must be addressed if one is to carry out a sustained normative critique of international economic law and its institutions.
II Justice and International Economic Law
The question of justice and international economic law is at heart nothing more (or less) than the question of fairness: are the rules, institutions and outcomes in transnational economic relations "fair" or "unfair?" However, it is deceptively simple to ask such a question, because the answers lead us into some of the most complicated and contentious issues of economic and political theory today.
Some of the topics and issues that come up when one seeks to answer this seemingly simple question are: As a starting point, it is useful to divide approaches to these questions into two basic groups: the "external" approach and the "internal" approach. As will be seen, each plays a vital role in our attempts to answer the questions, and each has its own methodologies, strengths and limitations.
A External versus Internal Approaches to Justice and International Economic Law
The essential characteristic of all external approaches (and most current approaches are external) is that they take a particular normative theory and apply it to a body of law. In contrast, internal approaches to the question of international economic law and justice begin with a radically different starting point: within the system or phenomenon of economic relations and their regulatory structure, and not outside of them. 43 For example, internal approaches to trade and justice (and we discuss two here -James' structural equity approach and an approach based on consent) begin with trade as an experience or trade law as a system, and seek to articulate those principles inherent in each, which must be respected if trade is to be trade, and if trade law is to function optimally to achieve its social purpose.
Both of these approaches -the external and internal -have unique methodological approaches and will illuminate distinct aspects of both international economic law in general and our specific question of the fairness of the trade law system. We will now discuss in turn both approaches with respect to trade law, illustrating them as we proceed with examples of how each approach works. Moreover, the fact that we are dealing in transnational normative obligations gives rise to unique challenges. Therefore, the first step is to develop a general account of the relationship between trade law and political theory that accounts for the possibility of normative claims within international economic law.
Engaging Trade and Justice Generally
There is a range of possible avenues through which to establish a basis for normative obligations within international trade law. One approach to the relationship is Lea Brilmayer's "vertical thesis," which treats this as a question of the legitimacy of state action. For Brilmayer, "governmental coercion that extends across international borders is governmental coercion nonetheless," 45 and must be justified by reference to some form of political theory, or it will lack legitimacy. Thus, the authority for transboundary state action is ultimately derived from its justification in traditional political morality. 46 Such justification is "vertical," in that it is drawn "upwards" from the political norms regulating the underlying relationship between the individual and the relevant political institution, rather than "horizontally" according to international legal theory, this approach is no longer adequate given the post-war human rights revolution, and leads to the sorts of problems raised by critics such as Beitz.
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The leading contemporary alternative is cosmopolitanism, which locates all international moral obligations at the level of the individual. 55 However, cosmopolitanism depends upon a view of international society as composed of persons, not states, which strikes many as empirically unjustifiable, given the many deep political and social divisions among the world's people.
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One can also attempt to follow something of a compromise approach, in which the role of justice in international economic relations is a function of our individual moral commitments, carried out in the international arena through the state as our moral agent. Where individuals cannot effectively act to address moral questions, the moral obligations create a case for moral agency at the collective level: the state. 57 The obligation to do justice applies to the government of State X as the agent of its citizens, stemming from the moral obligations of its citizens, the nature of justice, and the functions and powers of the state. The moral responsibility remains ultimately our own, even if the acts are taken at the collective agency level. Under both deontological and consequential approaches to justice, territorial boundaries need not preclude the possibility of transnational moral obligations -quite the opposite. 63 Under the deontological approach, the obligation to do justice is founded on a duty one owes to all persons by virtue of their status as human beings 64 . There is no room in this theory for limitations based on the contingent circumstances of national boundaries. 65 If one has such a duty, one has it absolutely to all persons everywhere. 66 Therefore, national boundaries may affect our choice of instrumentalities and our overall effectiveness, but they do not affect the nature of the obligation itself.
In a consequentialist approach such as utilitarianism, the fact that one finds oneself separated by a boundary from the object of one's moral inquiry may affect one's utility calculus in a material way. The difficulties associated with determining the utility effects of a given act or practice are well-known, and interposition of a national boundary may well make that more difficult. 67 It may also be even more impractical or expensive to maximize the utility of persons 63 Deontological ethics focus on the nature of acts regardless of the effects of such acts. What is important here is that the act conforms with some moral maxim or norm (e.g. Kant's categorical imperative). An alternative approach is consequentialism, in which approach territorial boundaries could be considered important because one's surroundings and circumstances bear on how we morally evaluate an act. At an intuitive level, there is a certain plausibility to the assertion that for justice to be possible, there has to be a minimum level of the sort of institutional community Aristotle referred to as "having a share in the constitution." 71 Accepting for the moment Aristotle's contention that the applicability of justice is limited to conditions in which social goods are allocated in a context of mutual political and legal relationships, the relevant question is whether international society is such a community. The dramatic evolution of the treaty-based international economic system and the social and economic interconnectedness characteristic of globalization suggest that we may be seeing at least elements of a transnational community of justice emerging at least within certain spheres, such as among the parties to significant global socio-economic treaties. One of the most critical elements in a normative critique of trade law is to carefully articulate the specific nexus between institutional activity on the ground and the principles of the theory: how does the specific international, economic and legal character of the situation influence the suitability and application of the theory? Each political theory will have specific core assumptions and principles unique to that theory, which must be specifically engaged with 79 I should qualify this to say, unsupportable at least in their strong Hobbesian form. Nagel presents a compelling account of the necessity for more effective transboundary political institutions, even at some cost to legitimacy, before we can meaningfully begin to talk about global justice, characterizing this view as Hobbesian in spirit if not in letter. Nagel, supra note 13, at 147. Even Nagel, however, concludes that we are on a positive path towards global justice, albeit on a perhaps more circuitous and less satisfying route than cosmopolitans would desire. Id.
the socioeconomic context of trade if the theoretical critique is to be trenchant, and not merely superficial.
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As an illustration, we offer the following example, drawn from work on Rawls and trade law. 81 The key normative assumption underlying a Rawlsian account of trade and justice is that differences in natural endowments, and any differences in the allocation of social goods stemming from these natural inequalities, are unmerited or morally arbitrary. 82 The task of international justice is to furnish principles that will serve both as a standard for evaluating the social response to natural inequalities, and as a guide to social institutions for making distributive allocations that will justify social inequalities. The key to making this translation between Rawlsian justice and trade law lies in understanding the normative significance of markets, not as social mechanisms for resource allocation but as markers for the cumulative effects of natural and social inequalities. In other words, the relative size and strength of markets can indicate to us how many of the natural and social inequalities among states have translated into the relative strength of consumer markets and producer groups.
The primary doctrinal tools within trade law for addressing inequality problems are collectively referred to as 'special and differential treatment,' and consist of three main elements: market access, market protection and technical assistance. 83 In key ways, each of these tools shifts the relationship between developing country markets and developed country markets in ways significant to both trade patterns and the Rawlsian theory of justice. Applying Rawls' difference principle to trade law with an understanding of the role of the market as a 80 For a fuller discussion of the methodological issues attendant to justice theorizing concerning international economic law, see generally Carmody, Garcia and Linarelli, "Conclusion," in Global Justice, supra note --. 81 manifestation of economic inequalities, suggests that in a liberal theory of just trade, market access would need to be established on terms that benefit the least advantaged. Since preferential market access is managed through special and differential treatment rules, this imperative can also be understood as a normative criterion placed upon special and differential treatment law as a condition of the difference principle. Thus the basis for a Rawlsian critique of special and differential treatment -and trade law in general -is established.
C Internal Approaches to the Justice of International Economic Law
Taken together, external theorists operate through essentially the same basic structure:
develop a broad, strong principle of justice within a given framework and then address the issues arising from its implementation through international law and institutions. External theorists superimpose principles of justice such as human rights or distributive principles on the present structure of international economic law institutions. Such principles are only loosely related to international economic law institutions as structured presently. The contribution of external theorists is to suggest mechanisms whereby the full application of these principles can be more gradual, nuanced and in keeping with institutional and political realities. However, the impact of such externally based theories of justice has been rather limited and the policy suggestions of such approaches have been criticized for being "at best, of second order concern and, at worst,
However, there is a way to approach the relationship between principles of justice and international economic law from an entirely different perspective, one that does away with the need for such complex attempts at mediation. To begin with, what if we looked for principles of 84 Tesón and Klick, Global Justice at 1.
justice within the systems and institutions we are studying, instead of outside them? 85 This is the premise behind Aaron James' intriguing "structural equity" approach to global justice.
Alternatively, we can begin with our understanding of trade as a phenomenon, which contains within itself intrinsic elements of great relevance to a justice inquiry. This leads to an approach similar to that James, but focused on a phenomenological investigation of trade rather than on the deduction of principles of structural equity from the legal framework of the system. This investigation into the nature of trade as a human experience reveals that many aspects of current trade law and policy mix what is ostensibly trade with something else-exploitation, coercion, or predation. This has important normative and pragmatic implications for global trade policy, and offers us a radically different take on the possibility of and approach to global justice, as well as the institutions within the free trade regime.
Structural Equity
In "Global Economic Fairness: Internal Principles" Aaron James examines principles of fairness that are inherent within the global economic system by virtue of the structure of that system. These principles comprise "structural equity," the manner in which an institution distributes its advantages and disadvantages in order to achieve equitable results.
86 85 See, e.g., RICHARD MILLER, supra note 3 at 71 (distinguishing 'deliberations with a goal of justice internal to the regime from deliberations with external goals.'). 86 James distinguishes three principles of structural equity in trade relations. The first principle concerns the harms from trade, that is, certain individuals will be adversely impacted by free trade and measures should be taken by states to alleviate such impact. An example of this principle is the controversial Trade Adjustment Assistance that was attached to the bills of the FTAs between the US and Korea, Panama and Colombia in US Congress. The second principle requires that the gains of trade be equally distributed within a society, or in manner acceptable to all members of that society. The third principle is simply the second principle brought up on a global basis so that trading societies share equally in the gains of trade or distribute those gains in a manner acceptable to them all. Aaron James, Global Economic Fairness: Internal Principles in GLOBAL JUSTICE AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW supra note 5, (hereinafter James, Internal Principles).
Thus, instead of discussing justice in international trade from the point of view of external approaches (such as communitarianism or cosmopolitanism), internal approaches look at the system as it is already structured, and offer a prescriptive analysis rooted in the framework of the trade regime. Through the concept of "structural equity," which dictates how gains and burdens are shared within a system 87 , we can try to deduce standards of justice, which can be applied to international economic law as a means of evaluating policies and procedures, and offering policy recommendations.
The World Trade Organization can serve as an example. The aim of the WTO is clear:
"to preserve the basic principles and to further the objectives underlying this multilateral trading Thus, justice and fairness are an intrinsic part of the WTO because they are integral parts of the system itself.
The existence of internal principles of structural equity in a system makes it easier to deduce standards of justice to evaluate that system. These standards of justice are connected closely with standards of legitimacy. Although legitimacy can be a purely formal concept, justice plays a significant role in determining if an institution is legitimate because, after all, principles of structural equity require some degree of internal consistency within an institution. By consent here we do not mean the concept of state consent in international relations theory. 93 In international law, consent is a formal principle of legitimacy. As such, this notion of consent is important to the extent trade law is part of international law, and trade agreements are instruments under international law. In the present discussion, however, we seek through The concept of consent as an internal principle of trade is revealed through examination of aspects of our language, concepts, and cultural experiences of trade as a human phenomenon.
Trade is a fundamental part of human experience. It encapsulates our relation to the world, our encounter with the world and our domination of the world. predation. In such cases, an economic benefit flows from one party to the other, but it is not mutual in any meaningful way.
The same can be said in cases of coercion, where there is some consent on the surface but the artificial restriction on the range of possible bargains makes consent a pure formality.
Further, exchanges that do not involve roughly equal value cannot be considered trade but are a , 1998) form of exploitation when a potentially higher bidder has been excluded by the prevailing party, which is therefore exploiting the other in the resulting bargain.
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Consent is a standard of justice. However, unlike equality, it is not derived from the structure of an institution but from a rather intuitive understanding of trade generally. Although the applicability of consent in a multilateral context such as the WTO has yet to be fully explored, 97 it is clearly a very robust standard in evaluating justice and fairness in other aspects of international economic law, such as bilateral trade agreements, investor-state dispute resolution and the generalized system of preferences.
Working with Internal Approaches -the case of DR-CAFTA
Applying internal approaches to actual international trade agreements illustrates the subtle but important forces at work in contemporary trade relations, particularly as they involve substantial inequalities in power among participating states. These inequalities and their structural consequences undercut global justice through their effects on the rules of the game, making it less likely that trade law and institutions will either meet members' legitimate expectations of equality, or establish rules supporting true consensual exchanges among market actors.
The use of consent as an internal principle of justice in trade law suggests that in matters of global rulemaking, which today means principally economic rulemaking through trade agreements, we should actually structure such negotiations to achieve and reflect the consent of their participants, aiming for substantive rules which protect and support consent at the private 96 Hillel Steiner, A Liberal Theory of Exploitation, 94 ETHICS 225 (1983-84) . See also RICHARD MILLER, supra note 3 at 60-62 (characterizing exploitation in international bargains as taking advantage of another's difficulty to secure agreements not otherwise possible).
97 But see RICHARD MILLER, supra note 3 at 69-83 (positing an account of 'reasonable deliberations' at the WTO that focuses on coercion and exploitation).
party level. We do this not as a way of confining trade within a particular view, but as a way to promote its flourishing across the widest possible spectrum of individuals, transactions, and relationships.
First, this requires that we take the role of consent in trade negotiations seriously. If trade consists of voluntary, bargained-for exchanges, then the rules governing trade must preserve the possibility of bargained-for exchanges among private parties, and the rules themselves must be the fruit of such a bargain. 98 If the rules of the game are not mutually agreed to, then any bargains struck under those rules are not fully free because they are not fully agreed to.
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Without consent, agreements structuring economic exchange will be a form of oppression, or worse, predation, which cause systemic disadvantages to certain players.
100
Consent must extend to difficult questions: whether the states have anything resembling equal bargaining power; whether a negotiating government speaks for the full range of affected citizens (or whether it speaks for its people at all); and whether a government has an adequate alternative to a negotiated outcome. 101 Otherwise, we risk mistaking formal consent in the sense used in international relations theory, for that consent which makes trade, trade. 100 Id. at 514-15. 101 In negotiation theory, the latter is referred to as a party's Best Alternative To a Negotiated Agreement (BATNA).
If a party has no BATNA, it is in a very weak position. BATNA "is the only standard which can protect you both from accepting terms that are too unfavorable and from rejecting terms it would be in your interest to accept." ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES 97 (1981 Consent problems are not confined to the negotiation stage -they affect the substance of the treaty as well, ensuring that provisions arrived at nonconsensually through severely unequal bargaining will affect economic relations among market actors for the duration of the treaty. For example, the terms and timing of market access speak volumes about a weaker party's capacity to protect its markets from external competition before local industry is ready. Moreover, when we look at which sectors are excluded by whom and why, we get a more complete picture of the weaker party's ability, or lack thereof, to bargain for what it wanted and needed.
To take the agriculture sector as an example, CAFTA eliminates the protections in place for regional small-scale farmers and agricultural workers in several key sectors such as rice and Second, and related, is a concern to carefully articulate the normative significance of these features. In other words, the persuasiveness and impact of an internal approach depends upon the clarity and cogency of the principles one draws from the system or underlying concept not know the full details of the negotiations for some time, as all members of the CAFTA negotiations signed confidentiality agreements. (last visited Mar. 17, 2007) under analysis. One could call this the deductive move in the internal approach, as one seeks to deduce from the socio-legal features one has identified, their normative implications.
Finally, it is important to sustain the analysis all the way through to the norms, institutions and dynamics of the legal system under review. A unique characteristic of internal approaches is that there is a strong interdisciplinary aspect to them. By looking at the legal theoretical framework of institutions of international trade, or trade itself as human experience, we take, and are obligated to take, into account discussions that traditionally would fall within the domain of political science, economics etc. In fact, the internal approach to trade is an attempt to bridge the gap between these disciplines and to overcome the disconnect between global justice theorists and the realities of the international trade regime. 120 Here the same issues of application and context raised above with respect to the external approach, apply equally to the internal approach. Ultimately, the value of any internal approach must be judged by the same standard: how effectively does it identify serious injustices in contemporary international economic law, and how effectively does it suggest how international economic law should be renegotiated, reformed, etc.
Looking ahead, we can expect as the internal approach develops and matures, there will be other methodological issues to consider and new internal approaches with which to enrich our arsenal of justice tools. One interesting area for future work involves undertaking a more explicitly phenomenological approach to trade law. The on-going trade linkage or "trade and ___" debate confronts us with the relationship between the rules and structures of trade law, and many serious contemporary problems involving gross economic inequalities, conflicting concepts of human dignity and environmental protection, and other heavily value-laden issues such as "culture" and "property." In discussing linkages such as "trade and development," "trade and labor," "trade and the environment," and "trade and human rights," we are delving more deeply and perhaps even more problematically into the nature of the relationship between trade and justice.
122
A Justice and the "Trade and ___" Debate Each "trade and " debate fundamentally involves a series of questions about justice.
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They are questions of justice because they involve decisions as to the allocation of social goods and social burdens across national boundaries; they highlight the effects of our actions on the well-being and property of others across national boundaries; and resolving them will involve evaluating the propriety of certain gains and the correction of improper gain across national boundaries.
The relationship between poverty, inequality, development and trade is a paradigmatic example of the link between trade and justice. The distribution of social goods has always been a central concern in justice theory. The connection between the global economic system (of which trade and trade law are foundational elements) and the uneven allocation of wealth among states and among individuals is widely recognized, even if its precise nature is hotly contested. To some extent, these problems are artifacts of an external approach to global justice, in which mandates are imposed (or allegedly imposed) upon trade from a normative perspective extrinsic to the framework of these agreements. However, it is important to point out that such an external approach is entirely consistent with how we critique any other form of law.
Moreover, it is important to remember (and here a justice perspective is clarifying) that wealth redistribution is already under way through existing international economic law institutions, since they play an inescapably allocative role with respect to the rights, privileges, opportunities Nevertheless, the promise of internal approaches to trade and justice is that they do not suffer from this criticism -instead, they take the system as it functions and seek to clarify and deepen the principles inherent in its structure. In this sense, internal approaches to the problem of trade and justice have developed an important new approach complementing the significant work already underway in external approaches. However, there is much important work to be done in both external and internal approaches if international economic law is to fulfill its role within the larger quest for global justice.
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